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Abstract: A collective floodplain aquaculture (FPA) management approach, 
developed in the Daudkandi sub-district of Bangladesh, has become popular 
among local landowners of floodplains for managing aquacultural operation in 
their lands. Taking inspiration from a small-scale FPA formed by landowners, 
an NGO modernized the approach when it collaborated with the community in 
applying the management approach in a larger floodplain in 1996. Since then, the 
success of the early FPA resulted in proliferation of more NGO-collaborated FPAs 
and independently-formed FPAs. In this paper, we try to find how this manage-
ment system has evolved over time in both types of FPAs. By studying 15 FPAs 
selected from five districts, we tried to identify the modifications in organizational 
and operational aspects of these FPAs. In the Daudkandi region, we observed 
that, as the realization of profitability increased among the landowners, they not 
only formed new FPAs by themselves but also, in some FPAs, tried to confine 
the rising benefits among themselves by excluding non-landowners’ participants. 
We also found the emergence of professional aquacultural managers who man-
250 Yamin Bayazid et al.
age the aquacultural operation of an FPA by leasing it from FPA’s management 
committee. We conclude that, in the Daudkandi sub-district, the FPAs evolved 
along the way as users adaptively responded to the problem of lower profits by 
innovating lease-based management. In other parts of the country, where the FPA 
trend is relatively new and the FPA management committees were found to be 
still running the aquacultural operation instead of leasing it, the direction of the 
evolution should be carefully examined in the context of the community resource 
management.
Keywords: Collective management, exclusion, floodplain aquaculture, modifica-
tion of rules and practice
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1. Introduction
The spread of floodplain aquaculture (FPA1) is one of the accompanying trends 
of a countrywide expansion of aquaculture in Bangladesh, which, with 1,956,900 
tonnes, is the sixth largest producer of cultured fish in the world (FAO 2016). 
While the spread of overall aquaculture has been observed since the country’s 
independence in 1971, the trend of aquaculture in seasonal floodplain water-
bodies is comparatively new. Although there were reports of a stocking-based 
rise of harvested fish from floodplains since 1988-89 (Ahmed 1999; Islam 1999), 
numerous studies have reported the recent mainstreaming of the FPA phenom-
enon (Gregory et al. 2007; Toufique and Gregory 2008; Belton et al. 2011; Haque 
et al. 2011; Sultana 2012). In addition, the Department of Fisheries (DoF) only 
began publishing FPA data in its annual Fisheries Resource Survey System report 
in 2011 (FRSS 2011). 
Not surprisingly, the spread of FPA has also witnessed development of sev-
eral types of FPA practices. Among them, one management system has been 
regularly featured in various studies – sometimes as the sole focus, sometimes 
in comparison with other similar practices (Gregory et al. 2007; Toufique and 
Gregory 2008; Mustafa and Brooks 2009; Sultana 2012; Khan 2015; Bayazid 
2016). The development of this management system has been attributed to a non-
governmental organization (NGO) called SHISUK2, and its collaboration with a 
community of the Daudkandi sub-district in the Comilla district to form an FPA 
1
 In this paper, by ‘FPA’ we will mean, depending on the context, the floodplain aquaculture as a 
distinct type of aquaculture practice, and also the collective management group formed by investors 
for practicing such aquaculture.
2
 Shikhya, Shastha, Unnayan Karjakram in Bengali, which can be translated into English as Educa-
tion, Health and Development Programme
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was widely recognized as pioneering. This first NGO-collaborated FPA (NFPA), 
Pankowri Fisheries Ltd (Pankowri, hereafter), was formed in 1996. While the 
NGO promotes the management system by referring to it as the Community 
Enterprise model, it is popularly known as the Daudkandi model of FPA. The 
profitability of an FPA enterprise, demonstrated by this NFPA, resulted in the 
proliferation of more than 50 FPAs in the neighbouring communities across a 
span of two decades. While the NGO promoted and partnered with a few of 
these FPAs, others were independently formed by landowners from various 
floodplains. The NGO later expanded their FPA programme in other parts of the 
country.
However, how this FPA management system evolved over time – in the NFPAs 
and independently-formed FPAs (IFPAs) – is yet to be adequately explored. 
Khan (2015) indicated that over the years, some changes have occurred since 
its first application. Given the common-pool resource (CPR) nature of the flood-
plain water-bodies, modifications in management systems are not unexpected, as 
Ostrom (1990, 58) identified that “appropriators designed basic operational rules, 
created organizations to undertake the operational management of their CPRs, 
and modified their rules over time in light of experience according to their own 
collective-choice and constitutional-choice rules”. Identifying and studying such 
changes will shed light on critical aspects of the collective management of com-
munity resources, such as how users responded to the opportunities opened up 
through improved use of the resources or solved management problems using 
their experiences over time (Agrawal 2001; Olsson et al. 2004; Carlsson and 
Berkes 2005; Ostrom 2007; Armitage et al. 2009; Berkes 2009; McGinnis and 
Ostrom 2014). The purpose of this study is to identify the extent and nature of 
the modifications – whether uniform or varied, considering the numerous adop-
tions – made over the last two decades by the participants of the FPAs. By study-
ing organizational and management aspects of FPAs selected from five districts 
of Bangladesh, this study attempts to articulate those modifications. As this FPA 
management system was expanded through independent adoptions and NGO-led 
programmes, the study covers both types of FPAs, with an emphasis on NFPAs.
The article is outlined as follows: Section 2 reviews briefly the development 
of this management system, followed by a brief theoretical framing of collective 
FPAs in Section 3. Methodology and data collection are presented in Section 4. 
Collected data regarding the FPAs are offered in Section 5, and their discussion is 
presented in Section 6. Section 7 draws some concluding remarks.
2. Proliferation of FPAs by adapting the NGO-promoted 
 management approach
In Bangladesh, 2.8 million ha of water-bodies are formed every year by inunda-
tion of floodplains, which is the largest among all inland open water-bodies in the 
country (FRSS 2017). Most of these floodplains are composed of private lands, 
which are mainly used for agricultural purposes during dry seasons. However, 
252 Yamin Bayazid et al.
because of the historical background of colonialism, the government holds rights 
over large tracts of floodplains. Regardless of such distinctions, during the mon-
soon, a floodplain usually becomes a single water-body, connecting lands which 
are owned by different owners, and sometimes under different property rights 
regimes. Thus, they become unusable for investment-based resource development 
or extraction unless some collective arrangement is made among rights-holders 
about all the aspects of any specific uses. This is more pertinent to the water-
bodies that are formed by connecting plots of lands separately owned by many 
individuals, because individuals cannot exercise the authority of government 
agencies when annual flooding makes the boundaries among the lands practically 
ineffectual. In this study, we will solely concentrate on FPA practices in this latter 
kind of floodplain water-bodies. 
Therefore, an FPA initiative in private floodplains seemed difficult or simply 
inconceivable to implement because of floodplain water-bodies’ seasonally dif-
ferentiated uses and involvement of various numbers of landowners, among other 
reasons. Formation of an FPA would also require considerable investment in infra-
structure because of the water-body’s nature, in addition to fish culture related 
investments. There is also concern over unenforceability of access controls and 
non-compliance with other rules, which might cause benefits to be appropriated by 
non-authorized and/or non-investor community members. At the same time, a few 
scattered initiatives failed due to lack of agreements about and conflicts over shar-
ing costs and benefits, alternative seasonal uses of floodplain lands, etc. (Thompson 
2005). Thus, for a long time, floodplain water-bodies in private lands remained 
mainly the open access source of capture fishery for neighbouring communities. 
An adoptable model of collective and self-organized FPA management must 
demonstrate that such obstacles can be dealt with, and considerable returns can be 
generated from aquaculture activities in floodplains. The Community Enterprise 
model initiated in the Daudkandi sub-district in 1996 was reported to meet these 
criteria (Gregory et al. 2007; Toufique and Gregory 2008; Khan 2015).
However, the SHISUK’s collaborative attempt to establish an FPA was not the 
first of its kind in this community. A small group of landowners started an FPA 
named Dhanuakhola Nagarpar Adarsha Motsha Chash Prokalpo (Dhanuakhola) 
in a small floodplain of 13.35 ha land in 1984. There had been no other success-
ful FPA in the community until Pankowri was formed in 1996. Nonetheless, the 
precedent of Dhanuakhola in the community proved important, as SHISUK cited 
its profitability in motivating the neighbouring landowners to form Pankowri. 
By forming Pankowri in a larger floodplain, SHISUK modernized and improved 
upon previous practices, devised ways to solve past difficulties, and expanded the 
scope of collective FPA enterprises. 
Figure 1 shows the chronological spread of the FPAs formed under the stud-
ied management system. These FPAs were primarily formed in one of two ways. 
First, following the success of Pankowri, SHISUK formed more NFPAs through-
out the 2000s in partnership with community stakeholders in various parts of 
the Daudkandi region. From the early 2010s, the NGO gradually expanded its 
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FPA programmes in other districts. Second, landowners formed IFPAs by play-
ing leading roles without any NGO involvement. These types of FPAs, formed 
through flexible application of the NGO-promoted management approach, are 
very common in the neighbouring communities of the Daudkandi sub-district. 
The proliferation of IFPAs showed that the development and management of 
FPAs can happen without the NGO initiative and involvement when community 
participants successfully engage on their own. 
The formation steps and management cycle now generally followed in these 
FPAs are shown in Figure 2. The green boxes depict the seasonal cycle of aqua-
culture, such as stocking, nurturing, harvesting, etc., in a floodplain water-body 
once an FPA has been formed. The yellow boxes show the preliminary forma-
Figure 1: Chronological spread of FPAs based on the studied management system.
Figure 2: FPA formation and management cycle (Yellow boxes indicate the formation stages 
and green boxes the annual operations) Source: Adapted and modified from Bayazid (2016).
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tion stages of mobilization, reaching agreement, obtaining capital, setting physi-
cal boundaries, and forming a management committee. However, in the absence 
of a successful demonstration prior to SHISUK’s intervention, these preliminary 
stages were perceived to be more difficult, as shown by the lack of collectively 
managed FPAs.
3. Theoretical underpinnings of NGO intervention and  collective 
management of FPAs
SHISUK’s intervention to promote FPAs in various parts of the country can be 
regarded as an extension of conventional co-management practices. In its clas-
sic conception, co-management was understood as sharing responsibilities and 
authority, primarily between central government agencies and local users, in man-
agement of a resource (Jentoft 1989; Berkes et al. 1991; Pomeroy and Berkes 
1997; Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Beem 2007). However, through a meta-analy-
sis of co-management interventions in developing countries, Evans et al. (2011, 
1940) showed that many “co-management projects involve support by indepen-
dent organizations or non-governmental organizations, in place of the state”. This 
was precisely the role of SHISUK in developing FPAs. The NGO, SHISUK, col-
laborated with the community in promoting aquaculture practices without any 
government initiative framework for or involvement in managing FPA enter-
prises. The involvement of government agencies in similar FPAs occurred only 
after the trend became popular among landowners. Furthermore, the NGO not 
only made investments, but also participated in management and day-to-day oper-
ations of the FPAs. Therefore, responsibilities and authority were also shared to 
some extent by community stakeholders (landowners and other shareholders) and 
the NGO. In contrast, the participation of government agencies was limited to 
providing financial and technical support, and research collaboration during the 
project periods in which they collaborated. 
In the realm of property rights, there are two aspects regarding the collective 
management of floodplains for aquaculture operation. One set of property rights 
determines exclusivity of the owner for benefits and costs accrued by owning and 
using the resource, along with transferability of these rights through voluntary 
exchange (Tietenberg and Lewis 2009). Sometimes these rights also authorize the 
kind of use for the user or user-groups. This type of authorization is more relevant 
for running FPA operations in floodplains because the same floodplains are used 
for agricultural production in the dry season. In the collective management of 
FPA, a group of rights-holders is formed from the members of the community. 
This group has the sole right to use the specified floodplain for aquaculture opera-
tion. However, the lands within the floodplain are the private property of numer-
ous landowners. Therefore, the collective rights of the group to use the lands 
for their purpose is obtained by the simple mechanism of rent. Each individual 
landowner transfers their private property rights to the group for a specified period 
around the monsoon in exchange for a rent fee. In the dry season, the landowners 
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practise their private property rights by engaging in agricultural activities, mostly 
rice cultivation. 
Another aspect of property rights – consistent with the conceptualization of 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) – is related to the bundle of rights, responsibilities, 
and limitations of the members of the collective group that holds the rights to use 
the floodplain for aquaculture operations. The rights to the benefits of the aqua-
culture operation are the basic rights of a member of such a group. These rights 
are based on the personal investment they made, especially at the beginning of 
FPA formation. However, the real management and operation of such an FPA 
is run by a committee composed of a few selected members from the group of 
rights-holders. This type of management committee (MC) holds the rights to all 
sorts of collective-choice actions, such as making operational decisions and rules, 
and operational activities, including harvesting. The rights of ordinary members 
of the group are limited to benefits according to their investments and sometimes 
include rights to elect members of the MC. Constitutional-choice actions occurred 
during the formation of FPAs, and participation in such activities were determined 
by community members’ stakeholding, power relationships, and patterns of the 
communal decision-making process. 
Thus, in collective management of an FPA, common property rights are cre-
ated for a group of property users, so that they can collectively manage aquacul-
ture operation in floodplain water-bodies. Through the formation of such a group 
having common property rights, the erstwhile seasonal open access floodplain 
water-body has been brought under a common property regime. In NFPAs, the 
NGO is also a common property rights-holder based on its investment, and shares 
management responsibilities and benefits along with the other shareholders. In all 
FPAs, irrespective of their formation pattern, the investor rights-holders are now 
known as shareholders, and those who are selected for managing the FPA affairs 
are known as directors. Such a management committee is called a board of direc-
tors (BoD) or executive committee (EC). These terminologies will be used in this 
study for simplicity. 
4. Study sites and methods
Study sites. The study was conducted on fifteen FPAs, including both IFPAs 
(five) and NFPAs (ten), so that changes in their organizational and manage-
ment aspects could be studied side by side. At the time of the study, NFPAs 
were found in seven districts of Bangladesh. From them, five districts were 
selected where at least one fully operational FPA was found with records of 
continuous FPA operations. The sub-districts within these five districts where 
the FPAs are situated are identified in Figure 3. They are Daudkandi (Comilla 
district), Harirampur (Manikganj district), Shingra (Natore district), Rajapur 
(Jhalokati district), and Nazirpur (Pirojpur district). In the four sites outside the 
Daudkandi region, the FPA trend is relatively new. These sites were selected to 
explore whether there is any difference between the older and newer FPAs in 
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terms of organizational and management practices. It was attempted to select 
both NFPAs and IFPAs from all sites. However, while more than 50 FPAs – 
numerous IFPAs, along with six NFPAs – were found to be operational in and 
Figure 3: Study sites of five the sub-districts (Source: https://www.google.co.jp/maps/place/
Bangladesh).
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around the Daudkandi sub-district, only a few NFPAs that performed continu-
ously through a well-organized institutional scheme were found in the other 
four sites. As such, eleven FPAs – six NFPAs and five IFPAs – were selected 
from the Daudkandi region. One NFPA was selected from each of the remaining 
four sub-districts. 
Data collection. The data were primarily collected using interviews based 
on a structured questionnaire, supplemented during the field visits by non-
structured questions asked as the situations required. Two general field visits 
were conducted. The first visit (April and May of 2016) was conducted when 
the FPA staff were preparing the floodplain for the approaching monsoon by 
stocking part of the floodplain with young fish and/or nurturing them. The sec-
ond field visit (October and November 2016) was made during the harvesting 
season. 
Principal interviewees included FPA staff, directors, some ordinary share-
holders and lease holders. Collected data were checked against official documents 
wherever it was possible. Besides interviews, some participant observations were 
also conducted by attending the FPA meetings, harvesting sessions, and other offi-
cial activities (e.g. election of members of the BoD). In addition to FPA staff, NGO 
staff were also interviewed. The interviewees included NGO staff of each regional 
office, the FPA programme coordinator, and the executive director. Three types of 
data were collected. One type of data focused on the formation and development 
of the FPAs, including information regarding the mobilization of landowners 
and other community people, infrastructure, initial investment, landowners, and 
shareholders, among others. Data regarding management included information 
about aquaculture operations, the decision-making process, and administration 
rules and practices. The third category of data focused on changes in the manage-
ment practices over the years. 
5. Modifications in organizational and management aspects of 
FPAs
The fifteen studied FPAs are chronologically shown in Table 1, with their short-
ened names in parentheses. In the Daudkandi region, after Pankowri, SHISUK 
collaborated with the community in forming Khirai, LKS, Chargram, Shanto, and 
Proshanto, while landowners established IFPAs such as Charipara, Kushiara, Asia, 
and Shishir. DKK, Raninagar, UB, and Jhonjhonia were the result of SHISUK’s 
collaborative attempts outside the Daudkandi region, and were the earliest NFPAs 
in their respective communities. These four FPAs were originally formed through 
various projects where different government development agencies participated 
as facilitating partners. These agencies provided a portion of the infrastructure 
cost during the formation of the FPAs. However, their involvement was confined 
to the projects’ duration, and after that, the FPAs were supposed to function as 
other NFPAs. 
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5.1. Shareholder composition and its changes in the FPAs over the years
In all FPAs, the investments were made against issued shares, following the practice 
introduced by SHISUK in 1996. However, this was not the case of Dhanuakhola, 
which was formed in 1984. Although the participant landowners of this FPA made 
individual investments like all other FPAs, and divided profits accordingly, the prac-
tice of forming FPAs based on investments made against shares was not common at 
that time. Under share-based investment, a landowner usually makes an investment 
in proportion to his landholding amount. Thus, the landowner who had more land 
was entitled to have more shares. However, in Shishir, all landowners made equal 
investments regardless of landholding amounts. In NFPAs, there was an additional 
guideline limiting individual shareholding to 20 shares, even if the landholding 
amount permitted more shares. However, in newer NFPAs (Raninagar, DKK, UB, 
and Jhonjhonia), the practice of issuing shares in proportion to landholding amounts 
was not followed. Rather, any shareholder, including non-landowners, who resided 
in the community could buy a maximum of 20 shares. Nonetheless, such practices 
were not applicable to the NGO, as it was an extra-community institutional investor. 
Its share investment was determined at the mobilization phase by negotiating with 
the community partners, and the common practice was that the NGO would not 
invest more than 30% of the total share investment. 
The composition of shareholders was significantly different between NFPAs 
and IFPAs (Table 1). In the NFPAs, the NGO was the largest single shareholder 
holding 6.62% (Pankowri) to 30% (Jhonjhonia) of shares. Collectively, landown-
ers were the largest group, holding 92.68% (Pankowri) to 35.22% (Jhonjhonia) of 
shares. In addition to SHISUK and the landowners, other shareholders were local 
non-landowners, who could be classified into two categories. 
One category consisted of local landless people who did not possess any 
income-generating land. The older NFPAs (Khirai, LKS, Chargram and Shanto) 
maintained a specific quota of shares for this category. In this type of quota, one 
share was endowed to one landless person or household. However, among the 
more recent NFPAs – DKK, Raninagar, UB, and Jhonjhonia – only Jhonjhonia 
had such a quota (Table 1). These shares were actually allocated from the shares 
that were bought by the NGO, and the common practice was it endowed up to 
five percent of its shares to local poor who could not afford to purchase shares. 
Although SHISUK paid for these shares at the time of the usual investment, these 
shares were handed over to the landless after the NGO got back its invested money 
in the form of dividends earned against these shares. 
The other category of non-landowners included local well-off people who 
did not have any land in the floodplain which was under the FPA’s operation, 
but possessed lands in other parts of the community. They included traders and 
merchants, respected members of the community, elected representatives to local 
and national government bodies, and ordinary community members. These non-
landowner shareholders were known as VIP shareholders.
In the IFPAs, landowners were the major shareholders (Table 1). In most 
IFPAs, non-landowners were not permitted from the very beginning. Very few 
260 Yamin Bayazid et al.
non-landowner shareholders were found in these FPAs – in Charipara, two neigh-
bouring households; in Kushiara, three local religious institutions; and in Shishir, 
three non-landowners became shareholders by investing equally like other 
shareholders. 
These FPAs were all run by MCs composed of members selected from the 
shareholders. Given the landowners’ overwhelming proportion, only landowner 
shareholders were permitted to be directors in IFPAs, except for Asia, where three 
non-landowner directors were found. In these FPAS, MCs were formed through 
a process of deliberation and negotiation among incumbent and aspirant MC 
members, and sometimes community leaders. Nonetheless, changes in MCs were 
irregular and rare in IFPAs. In contrast, in the NFPAs, the general practice was to 
form a MC for a two year term by holding an election among shareholders. This 
practice was regularly followed in all NFPAs of the Daudkandi region, except in 
Pankowri, where the election was not regular. The basic requirements for both 
directors and voters were to be landowners and shareholders at the same time, 
although an exception was found in Pankowri, which had one non-landowner 
director. 
However, differences were found in directors’ requirements in the newer 
NFPAs (DKK, Raninagar, Jhonjhonia, and UB) where non-landowners were 
found in MCs. Here, the basic requirement to be a member and a voter was to 
be a shareholder. Nonetheless, like the NFPAs of the Daudkandi region, MCs of 
these NFPAs were also formed for two years. However, in these newer NFPAs, 
the number of aspirant candidates were few. Because of this, deliberations and 
negotiations among the few candidates were preferred to elections for forming a 
new MC. In addition, the NGO staff stated that an election might cause division 
and conflict among shareholders, as was experienced sometimes in some of the 
older NFPAs. Nonetheless, the option of an election was officially still available 
if deliberation failed or general shareholders preferred elections. It may be noted 
that the NGO did not have direct voting rights in selecting members of man-
agement committees, though it held the position of chairman of the MCs in all 
NFPAs, except Pankowri.
However, the number and composition of shareholders was not static, and this 
kind of change had a corresponding impact on the formation of MCs. The com-
position of shareholders changed in two ways. First, share composition changed 
when shareholders traded shares among themselves and with non-shareholders. 
The trading of shares, however, was guided by FPA-specific rules, which deter-
mined whether a non-landowner could buy shares or not. In all the IFPAs, no 
new non-landowners could purchase shares; however, the current non-landowner 
shareholders (e.g. in Charipara and Shishir) could sell their shares to other land-
owners. In contrast, the non-landowners could purchase shares of NFPAs, except 
in Pankowri. 
Shareholder composition also changed when FPA management changed 
shareholding rules or dissolved shares, as was found to happen in the following 
FPAs over the years:
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Pankowri: In the NFPAs, use of the landowners’ lands, the participation of 
SHISUK, and investments were based on a contract or agreement made at 
the inception of the FPAs with a valid period of five to ten years. The main 
reason behind the existence of such a contract was that the NGO was an extra-
community participant, and the contract gave the community landowners an 
assurance that the NGO had no intention of or would not be able to take pos-
session of the property of the landowners in case of default or loss in their col-
laborative enterprise. Additionally, the contract bound the parties to continue 
the FPA operation at least for the stipulated period, so that the initial invest-
ment costs could be recovered. Finally, the contract gave the NFPA a stable 
and firm structure for the time being, because within the contract period, no 
major organizational change was allowed. After expiration of the contract, the 
landowners might renew the collaboration after reconsidering its terms and 
conditions, including the nature and extent of involvement of all interested 
parties. 
In Pankowri, as per the contract made at its inception in 1996, shares were 
issued to any interested member of the community, including non-landown-
ers. Moreover, non-landowners were allowed in the MCs (like Raninagar, 
Jhonjhonia, or DKK). However, in 2008, after the expiration of the first con-
tract period, the landowners decided to renew their collaboration with the 
NGO but not with non-landowners. Thus, the non-landowners were forced 
to sell their shares. At the same time, shares were redistributed according 
to landholding amounts, and the landowners who had not bought shares at 
the inception were allowed to buy shares. Moreover, landholding was added 
as a requirement for directors. Now Pankowri had only two non-landowner 
shareholders besides SHISUK, and this was an exception to its general rules. 
Even some of SHISUK’s shares were bought back and dissolved by the MC. 
However, this kind of curtailing of SHISUK’s shares was not found in any of 
the other NFPAs. 
Kushiara: Like Pankowri, in Kushiara’s early years when not all landown-
ers had invested in shares, there was a provision for non-landowners to have 
shares. However, over subsequent years, such shares were bought back by 
making changes in its rules, and the landowners who had not previously 
bought shares were allowed to invest. Moreover, a previous quota of 5% of 
the shares to be maintained for local landless people was also revoked. 
Proshanto: In this FPA, two hundred shares that had been initially planned 
to be endowed to landless people and that were bought by SHISUK on their 
behalf were eventually dissolved by the management of the FPA on the 
grounds that there were no such landless people in the community who could 
be eligible for such endowment. 
Asia: The landless shares (186) were bought back and dissolved. 
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5.2. Emergence of lease-based management of aquaculture operation
In the early 2010s, a practice of lease-based management for the FPAs’ aquacul-
ture operations emerged in the Daudkandi region. Through a lease mechanism, 
an FPA transfers its rights to run aquaculture operations – instead of being man-
aged by the shareholders’ representative MC – to lessees in exchange for a lease 
fee paid to the FPA. Like all FPA activities, this leasing-out process was also 
administered by the FPA’s MC. Table 2 shows how the rights and responsibilities 
were shared between the MC of an FPA and lessees of the aquaculture operation. 
Through the lease mechanism, a MC’s rights to operational activities and related 
collective-choice actions regarding aquaculture were transferred to a group of les-
sees. All other rights and responsibilities regarding FPA management remained in 
the hands of shareholders and their representative MCs. 
Eight of the eleven studied FPAs in the Daudkandi region were now manag-
ing their aquaculture operation through lease-based mechanisms. In the light of 
this observation, we can classify the studied FPAs using the scheme shown in 
Table 3. Besides the categories of NFPAs and IFPAs, the FPAs can be differenti-
ated in relation to the group managing the aquacultural operation, as shown in the 
columns of Table 3. The aquaculture operations of Charipara, Kushiara and Asia, 
and the more recent NFPAs were found to be managed by shareholder nominated 
MCs. In 2007, Shishir was the first FPA to adopt a leasing mechanism; however, 
the mechanism was later significantly formalized by the NFPAs, as discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 
Table 4 contains lease related information of the FPAs that adopted the sys-
tem. It shows adoption year of the lease-based practice, tenure of the lease con-
tract, number of members of the current lessee group, etc. In addition, it shows 
the nature of the stakeholding relationships of the lessees, as discussed in the 
following section.
Table 2: Shared rights and responsibilities in FPAs with leased aquaculture operation.





Aquaculture operation: stocking, nurturing and harvesting ✓
Collective-choice action regarding aquaculture operation ✓
Dividend distribution to shareholders ✓
Land rent distribution to individual landowners ✓
Build/monitor/maintain necessary infrastructure and resource conditions ✓
Paying compensation for the damage of land and other property of 
individual landowners/surrounding households
✓
Decisions about leasing ✓
(Source: Authors’ Survey).
The evolution of a floodplain aquaculture management system 263
How the leasing system works: The aquaculture operation was leased at the 
beginning of each monsoon before stocking of the floodplain started. The pre-
ferred method of leasing was decided upon by directors of the FPA on behalf of 
the shareholders. Two methods were common among the FPAs. In the method fol-
lowed by all NFPAs, a lease circular was distributed in the community. Following 
the announcement, interested groups of lessees submitted their proposals to the 
MCs. Through a process of open bidding in the presence of directors, sharehold-
ers, and NGO staff, the highest bidder was selected from the proposals submitted. 
Sometimes this selection was done in a sealed-bid manner. After the selection, a 
contract was signed with the selected lessee group. This contract stated, among 
other terms, the tenure of the lease, mode of lease payment, geographical limit of 
the aquaculture operation, and rights and responsibilities of the parties. Another 
method of leasing involved a non-public and more informal search for a suitable 
lessee through personal communications of the directors of the FPA. After the 
leasing trend became popular, many lessees emerged in the Daudkandi region who 
engaged in this type of leasing ventures. The directors sometimes communicated 
with familiar lessees of their communities, and reached an agreement through less 
formal processes. This type of practice was found in Dhanuakhola. A variation of 
non-public leasing involved internal selection from interested directors of the FPA 
itself. Subsequently one or more directors leased the aquaculture operation from 
the MC. In Shishir, one interested director leased the aquaculture operation, and 
then managed it with the help of external lessees of his choice. 
Income for the FPA: The main purpose of an FPA was to generate income by 
running aquaculture operations in the floodplain. As the FPA was not to engage in 
this operation after transferring its rights to the lessee group, the lease fee it earned 
from this transfer to lessees became its sole income. This income was distributed 
as rent to the landowners, as dividends to the shareholders, as salaries to directors 
and other regular and irregular staff. It was also used for repair and maintenance 
of the floodplain and infrastructures, and paying compensation for any damage 
the aquaculture operation caused. The lease fee was usually paid to the FPA in 
Table 3: Classification of sample FPAs based on management of aquaculture operations.
















IFPAs=Independently formed FPAs; NFPAs=NGO-collaborated FPAs.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The evolution of a floodplain aquaculture management system 265
equal instalments at the beginning of each aquaculture season, if the aquaculture 
operation was leased for more than one season. 
The lessee group: Every lessee group had a leader with whom the lease con-
tract was formally made. A lessee group was organized in the same fashion as an 
FPA. Its members invested differently and shared returns accordingly, like the 
shareholders of the FPAs. However, lessee groups contained far fewer investors 
than the FPAs, as can be seen from the fact that the largest lessee group had 
22 members (Table 4), while the smallest FPA had 31 shareholders (Table 1). 
Moreover, participation in the lessee group was informal, flexible, and usually 
limited to the lease period. Nonetheless, there were lessee groups that had formal 
names and constant core members for managing the group’s various lease opera-
tions in different FPAs. In any case, the FPAs were found to have no significant 
prerequisite regarding the manner of formation or number of members of lessee 
groups. 
However, internally the lessee groups had varied members. One important 
point of variation emanated from the stakeholding relationships that the lessees 
had with the leasing FPA, in addition to being lessees. Based on these stakehold-
ing relationships, the lessees can be separated into two categories:
a) Some lessees had additional and direct stakeholding relationships with the 
leasing FPA as shareholders or directors. This category could be termed 
as insider lessees.
b) In contrast, there were lessees who had no stake in the leasing FPA as 
shareholders or directors. This group can be called outsider lessees. 
The nature of these stakeholding relationships is presented in Table 4. The table 
shows that many of the outsider lessees were actually directors or shareholders of 
other neighbouring FPAs. Different lessee groups had different characteristics in 
terms of stakeholding in the FPAs, which can be seen in the last row of the Table 4 
showing the percentage of lessees with any additional stake in any FPAs besides 
lease-holding. Most lessees had FPA related experience in one way or another. In 
addition, the table also shows information on lessees who were locally prominent 
traders of aquaculture inputs, such as fish feed, fertilizer, and fingerlings. 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Participation of non-landowner shareholders
In all types of FPAs, the landowners were the principal and common stakeholders. 
This is understandable, given that they privately owned the lands within which 
the FPA operations were conducted. However, non-landowners were also present 
in all types of FPAs in varied proportions, with important differences in rationale 
and methods of their inclusion. Below we provide the principle reasons for non-
landowners’ participation:
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1. Obtaining the necessary capital: In many FPAs – especially in the early 
ones – a portion of landowners were sceptical about the profitability of 
the FPAs and did not make share investment at the time of the FPA forma-
tion. These landowners were satisfied with any rent earnings they would 
receive in exchange for lowing their lands to be used by the FPAs. This 
was the case because, before the initiation of the FPAs, most landowners 
had left the floodplains largely unused during the monsoon, and they had 
earned little, if any, income from their lands in that season. Thus, when the 
prospect of income from the flooded lands occurred through the formation 
of the FPA, they were happy to receive rent income without the additional 
risk of making an investment in the venture. At that time, affluent non-
landowners who were ready to take the risk and make the investment were 
offered shares freely. As we have shown, such participation was mainly 
seen in the NFPAs, since these FPAs generally followed an inclusive prin-
ciple by not confining shares to any specific group, such as landowners, 
when they were initially issued.
2. Securing support, rule enforcement and leadership: The group of 
affluent non-landowner shareholders sometimes included community 
leaders, locally well-respected persons, or people of political professions, 
and other potential key community members, such as non-landowners liv-
ing on contiguous lands of a floodplain. This kind of involvement can be 
understood from two perspectives found in CPR theories. First, within the 
institutional model of social-ecological system (SES), as formulated by 
Anderies et al. (2004), these members of the community could be viewed 
as providers of ‘public infrastructure’ in the sense that their inclusion could 
facilitate enforcement of rules. The idea is that their involvement would 
ensure compliance with rules by participants (shareholders, directors, and 
landowners) and non-participant members of the community, such as by 
not poaching, along with quick, effective, and lasting resolution of any 
conflict. This perception was also reflected in the term ‘VIP shares’ by 
which such non-landowner shares were known among the FPAs. In addi-
tion, this type of inclusion would also guarantee these key non-landown-
ers’ commitment to comply with the rules of the FPA as participants and 
beneficiaries. The inclusion of neighbouring non-landowners was also 
found in IFPAs.
Second, the roles played by locally influential people can be perceived 
from their leadership status within the community (Olsson et al. 2007; 
Gutiérrez et al. 2011; Stöhr et al. 2014). In our study, we found that the 
participation – in the form of token endorsement to being a member of 
the regular decision-making body – of the community leaders and/or 
locally respected people provided the legitimizing foundation through 
their approval and support for the FPA initiatives. Moreover, some non-
landowners were cited as possessing important managerial skills, dem-
onstrating personal commitment, and taking direct responsibility for the 
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functioning of the FPAs. Few of these non-landowners ultimately bought 
lands within the floodplain to further strengthen and legitimize their 
involvement. It was reported that, in the earlier years of NFPAs, critical 
leadership roles regarding motivational support, guidance, and commit-
ment were provided by both landowners and non-landowners. This kind 
of involvement was especially found in the NFPAs, because the NGO 
itself is an extra-community entity.
3. Poverty alleviation: Landless community people were included to make 
the FPA initiative socially more beneficial. While the presence of landless 
community members was almost non-existent in the IFPAs at the time 
of the study (Table 1), in NFPAs their endowment-based inclusion was 
reported to mainly depend on their presence in the community and abil-
ity to invest in shares. In most of the NFPAs where there was no land-
less quota, and in Proshanto where planned allocation of such shares was 
ultimately cancelled, official staff reported that, in their community, there 
were no ultra-poor landless people who could not afford to buy shares. As 
these shares were endowed by the NGO from its own shares, we asked 
whether it conducted any survey to get information about local landless 
people before allocation of such shares. It became apparent that the NGO 
made its allocation decision upon information provided by the community 
leaders and landowners at the time of formation of the FPA or by the direc-
tors of the FPA rather than on any kind of survey. Therefore, the inclusion 
of local poor largely depended on how they were represented or reported 
by the community leaders or local members of the FPA management. 
The first two points explained why shares were not issued in proportion to land-
holding amounts and why non-landowners were found in MCs of Raninager, 
Jhonjhonia, and DKK, or even in Pankowri in its early years. Interestingly, while 
the participation – and subsequent exclusion in Pankowri – of the affluent non-
landowners in the MCs was observed in some FPAs, this had never been the 
case for the landless shareholders as they had never been members of MC in any 
FPA. Our observations from the field indicated that, to some extent, the absence 
of the landless in decision-making process was caused by the fact that the inclu-
sion of the landless people was based on endowment rather than on their active 
involvement in and support for the FPAs and/or on their socioeconomic impor-
tance within the community. It should be noted in this connection that, although 
the NGO allocated shares to local poor in many communities, it didn’t make any 
attempt to include these people in the MC. While it was difficult to predict the 
outcome of such attempts in their absence, the NGO perceived its share endow-
ment more as financial assistance similar to social safety net support rather than 
as empowerment programme for the ultra-poor. In addition, participation of the 
landless was impossible in many FPAs as no type of non-landowner was autho-
rised to become member of the MCs in these FPAs.
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However, arrangements for non-landowners’ participation were not perma-
nent, as we have seen in Pankowri or Kushiara, where non-landowners were 
eventually excluded. The reason for this change could be found in the growing 
realization among landowners of the profitability of FPA enterprises. This real-
ization was expressed in the unanimous responses of the interviewees about the 
increase in fish yield and resultant increase in income from the FPAs over the 
years. This enhanced realization can also be easily appreciated from the expan-
sion of the FPAs, and the ways access rules were modified. On one hand, only 
the prospect of a lucrative return motivated the landowners to collectively start 
aquaculture in their lands. At the same time, many landowners who had not previ-
ously bought shares ultimately became eager to obtain a share of the rising profits. 
Thus, the early role of the non-landowners as investors in an FPA became unnec-
essary, as the landowners themselves were now keen to invest in this profitable 
venture. In the IFPAs, the landowners as principal organizers were not usually 
willing to include non-landowners unless their inclusion helped the functioning 
of FPA management (as mentioned above); in a few IFPAs, like Kushiara, where 
non-landowners were involved, they were asked to leave. This was also observed 
in NFPA such as Pankowri. 
The exclusion of non-landowners indicated the attempt to confine the ben-
efits to as few people as possible. In some FPAs, this resulted in concentration 
of shares among only the landowners whose claims to participation and bene-
fits would be rather difficult to ignore because of their ownership of the lands 
of the floodplains. Consequently, landownership within the floodplain – which 
has always been an important determinant for user’s access rights in the FPA 
because of the private ownership of lands within floodplains – ultimately became 
the most important factor in gaining access rights and making legitimate claims 
to the benefit of the FPAs. Only those non-landowners who were too important 
to exclude remained as shareholders, such as national-level political figures or 
highly influential community members. Thus, in Pankowri and Kushiara, all this 
resulted in inclusion of erstwhile non-shareholder landowners and exclusion of 
non-landowner shareholders. 
The heightened realization of profitability also resulted in cancellation of 
shares that had been endowed to the landless, as was found in Asia and Kushiara. 
Regarding landless shares, a few FPA staff members – both from IFPAs and 
NFPAs – complained that some landless shareholders had sold their shares when 
they faced financial difficulties, and thus made the provision to provide support 
for them by endowing shares pointless. Although the efficacy of earnings from 
only one share in alleviating poverty of a landless poor household may be ques-
tioned, it should be mentioned that in NFPAs, most landless shareholders kept 
their shares. This is supported by the observation that the number of landless 
shareholders remained the same in these FPAs over the years. However, in the 
NFPAs, trading of endowed landless shares was not permitted, and if any land-
less shareholder traded his endowed share, that share would be cancelled. Thus, 
although a few FPA staff suggested that trading of landless shares occurred, they 
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had no documented record of such trading since no shareholders ever reported 
any such transaction. Whatever may be the case, in the context of a prevailing ten-
dency to confine profit among as few people as possible, selling of shares by land-
less shareholders prompted some FPAs’ managements to dissolve landless shares.
In addition, an understanding also common among landowners was that non-
landowners’ participation might have a negative impact on the FPA and on their 
property. This was because, as the non-landowners did not have any ownership 
stake in the floodplain, their participation in management might result in irrespon-
sible operational decisions, and thus might damage lands, neighbouring houses, 
the related infrastructure, or disrupt the seasonally alternative use of the flood-
plains, among other concerns. The absence of non-landowners in the IFPAs from 
the beginning indicated that such concerns had been always there in some degree. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that these concerns were accentuated by the FPAs’ ris-
ing profitability and consequent increased profit consciousness.
However, in most NFPAs – Khirai, LKS, Chargram, and Shanto – the inclu-
sion of non-shareholder landowners was slow and gradual, and did not result in 
exclusion of any non-landowners. This non-exclusion can be explained through 
three observations. First, these FPAs were formed a few years after the formation 
of Pankowri, and by that time the profitability of the FPAs was clearly demon-
strated. Thus, from the beginning, most of landowners bought shares in these 
FPAs and only a few were left out for personal reasons, such as absence of the 
household chief or disputes over land ownership, etc. Second, the non-landowners 
(besides the local landless) shareholders were mostly local elites whose involve-
ment was more of a token endorsement than any real involvement in the FPAs’ 
management. In addition, even if any non-landowners wanted to participate in 
the FPAs’ management, such involvement was institutionally impossible as no 
non-landowner was allowed to be a member of an MC or a voter for selecting 
such members, according to the FPAs’ rules. No non-landowner MC member was 
found in any of these FPAs. It is noteworthy that, unlike the first NFPA Pankowri, 
where non-landowners were initially allowed as members of a MC, in the follow-
ing FPAs, the landowners’ exclusive rights to the MC was in effect from the very 
beginning. This change in rules attested the landowners’ increased readiness to 
participate in FPA ventures and heightened realization of profitability from them. 
Finally, the continued participation of landless shareholders in these IFPAs 
indicated that this was caused by the presence of the NGO in these FPAs. 
Nonetheless, the interviewed directors of these FPAs expressed no objection 
against the continued sharing of benefits by non-landowners. Some held the view 
that since these non-landowners lived around the cultured water-body, their inclu-
sion would bring about their assistance, support, and compliance with FPA rules 
as beneficiaries of the enterprise. 
Nonetheless, even in these NFPAs, the number of landowner sharehold-
ers were reported to increase over time. This increase mainly resulted from the 
FPAs’ rules regarding election of members of the MCs. On one hand, since only 
landholders of a specified amount of land could compete in such elections in 
270 Yamin Bayazid et al.
these FPAs, it was reported that a few non-landowners bought or acquired lands 
through inheritance to become members of MCs. Having the required amount 
of land in one’s own name was important, because parents’ land could not be 
used for voting or candidacy purposes. However, since transaction of shares was 
allowed in these FPAs, acquiring shares was cited to be easier than acquiring 
land. On the other hand, as the voter was also required to be a landowner and 
shareholder, some candidates bequeathed the required amount of land and shares 
– which was very small – to his lawful inheritor to increase his number of votes. 
Every voter was important, because MC members were separately elected from 
each of the villages that surrounded a floodplain. Thus, in each village, the actual 
number of voters was not many. It was reported by FPA staff that they had to 
frequently update their official records for these new landowners and sharehold-
ers before elections. 
Therefore, it became evident that there was a gradual increase of the pro-
portion of landowners in shareholder composition in the studied FPAs of the 
Daudkandi region. With the increased realization among landowners of profitabil-
ity, the support of non-landowners became redundant and their sharing of benefits 
was perceived as an unwelcome extraction of benefits by outsiders at the expense 
of landowners’ more rightful claims. The idea of non-landowners’ involvement, 
especially the affluent ones, was now generally perceived by landowners as a 
meddling attempt, because access rights to FPAs were now being legitimized in 
terms of landownership more than they were at the beginning of the FPA trend. 
Even for the NGO, the priority in the Daudkandi region was to keep the landless. 
Interestingly, the involvement of the NGO was also viewed by a few landowners 
as unnecessary. SHISUK’s share reduction and removal from MCs’ chairman-
ship in Pankowri were the result of a few landowners’ opposition to its continued 
involvement in the FPA. 
However, a few interesting exceptions were found in the landowners’ gen-
eral attitudes toward non-landowners in those FPAs where the latter group was 
excluded or not allowed at all. In Asia and Pankowri, exceptions were made to 
the general rule to include non-landowner directors in MCs. Moreover, these non-
landowners were found to not even be shareholders. In the case of Pankowri, 
we learned that such an exemption which was made for one non-landowner was 
attributable to his power relations within the community. This exception to orga-
nizational rules stood in sharp contrast to other NFPAs, where aspirant non-land-
owners were found to abide by the rules and bought or obtained land through 
inheritance to fulfil the landholding requirement of a director. This indicates that, 
in some cases, the community’s internal dynamics of power relationships could be 
a direct determinant of the inclusion (and possibly the exclusion) of non-landown-
ers, along with their type and continuity as participants. Such inclusion or exclu-
sion ultimately translated into facilitation or contestation of the enforceability of 
the rules and functioning of FPAs in the community. For NFPAs, this signified 
that SHISUK’s role in maintaining the NFPA’s organizational integrity was also 
shaped by such community power dynamics.
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6.2. The innovation of lease management and rise of professional lessees 
During the last two decades in the Daudkandi sub-district, the shareholders and 
directors of the FPAs experienced many difficulties. Topping the list was unsatis-
factory profits or outright losses, leading to lower than expected or no dividends 
or land rents. In this respect, there were frequent mentions of various issues sur-
rounding the management committees’ handling of FPA affairs. These included 
complaints about inefficient management of aquaculture operations by the MCs, 
lack of cooperation and mistrust among the directors, along with typical allega-
tions of financial embezzlements, among others. The transfer of the FPA’s income 
generating function, aquaculture operation, through leasing mechanisms to les-
sees was innovated by the participants of the FPAs as a solution to these problems. 
Many interviewees reported that the primary reason for transferring the man-
agement risk and responsibility to a lessee group through lease management 
was to solve two major problems the FPAs were facing. First, the problem of 
lower profit or loss was solved through the lease mechanism because, under this 
mechanism, the lease fee became the income of the FPA instead of sales revenue 
from fish generated by aquaculture, upon which its profit previously depended. 
Moreover, the lease fee was riskless, because an FPA earned it without engaging 
in aquaculture operations, and thus without making any of the usual operational 
expenditures related to such operations. 
At the same time, since the challenge of managing aquaculture was trans-
ferred to the lessees, and how they managed that operation had no impact on the 
income of the FPA, this solved the second major problem hurting the income of an 
FPA resulting from any mismanagement of aquaculture operations by the respon-
sible management group. In Table 4 we showed that many of the lessees (58% to 
84%) were in fact, one way or another, related to the FPAs. Many respondents 
expressed the opinion that, under the lease-based system, the lessees – whether 
they were directors in the new role of lessees or any other outsider lessees – could 
hardly afford mismanagement of aquaculture operations, since the stakes for the 
few lessees were personal and high. The lessees ran the aquaculture operation by 
making considerable personal investments rather than managing irresponsibly the 
investments made by the shareholders of the FPAs. 
The interviewed lessees were found to be motivated to take risks to make 
an investment in leasing aquaculture operations, and mentioned the prospect of 
profits from such ventures as motivations behind such involvement. Thus, the 
lessees could be viewed as a new type of fishermen whose involvement in aqua-
culture was of an entrepreneurial nature. This was despite the fact that most of 
them had little or no experience in fish farming before the introduction of FPAs 
in their communities. However, as we have shown in Table 4, many lessees were 
either insiders of relevant FPAs or stakeholders of other FPAs, and gathered years 
of fish farming experience through managing the FPAs as directors. A few also 
cited their experiences in managing private pond aquacultures. More importantly, 
they were now aware of the profitability of aquaculture enterprises in floodplains. 
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While as FPA directors they could still earn remuneration for their services, those 
who were involved in leasing reported that they made higher income from higher 
investments. In addition, when someone managed the aquaculture operation as a 
director of an FPA, the losses as well as profits of the FPA were shared among all 
shareholders, and the portion of their personal loss or gain was not large. There 
was also mention of additional income in the form of commissions as the result 
of large scale and/or continuous purchase of aquaculture inputs from suppliers. 
Since this income was only accessible to those who were making decisions and 
managing the aquaculture operations, the directors in their roles of lessees could 
still benefit from such income. 
The size of the lessee group was usually small (Table 4), and corresponded to 
the average size of MCs. Like the members of the MCs, the lessees were respon-
sible for decisions about stocking, harvesting, managing, and other aspects of the 
aquaculture operations. Nonetheless, the extent of their involvement was greater 
than the usual managerial role of members of MCs because it was based on their 
considerably higher investment and resultant higher personal commitment to 
aquaculture operations. Some lessees were also found to manually participate 
in harvesting and other fish culture activities alongside the employed staff and 
labourers, like any other fishermen, as a part of direct monitoring. 
At the same time, many lessees also held leases in FPAs of neighbouring 
communities as members of the same or different lessee groups. For example, 
the lessee group of the Dhanuakhola FPA was found to manage several other 
FPAs. Thus, over time, there emerged a class of professional lessees who worked 
as investor-managers, and were specialized in the management of lease-based 
aquaculture activities. It can also be said that the rise of these professional lessees 
and lease-based management of FPAs’ aquaculture operations were two mutually 
reinforcing developments. 
 However, growth of aquaculture related professions was not limited to les-
sees, as the spread of FPAs was accompanied by the rise of various input sup-
pliers and output forwarders in the Daudkandi sub-district (Gregory et al. 2007; 
Toufique and Gregory 2008). In the other four sites, the FPA trend was too new to 
have resulted in the growth of such professions. 
When the staff and shareholders of Charipara, Asia, and Kushiara were asked 
why they did not adopt lease-based management of aquaculture operations, they 
responded that they were continuously making profits and the landowning share-
holders were happy with their management. While we did not collect any time 
series information on revenues of these FPAs, a glance at the FPA profits for the 
season 2015-16 showed that these three were among the eight FPAs which did 
make profit in that season.
7. Concluding remarks
This study aimed to trace the major organizational and management modifications 
that were introduced by participants of the FPAs as they experienced altered incen-
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tives and new challenges in the process of their continuous collective attempts. 
In the course of the study, the NGO SHISUK’s contribution in the development 
of FPAs in the Daudkandi region and the recent spread of the trend in other parts 
of Bangladesh was corroborated. However, after SHISUK’s intervention in the 
Daudkandi region, the expansion of FPAs was boosted by a trend of bottom-up 
adoption, where landowners formed FPAs to collectively manage aquaculture in 
their lands. Although the NGO remained as a non-landowner institutional partner 
in the NFPAs, it was the landowners – either as principal participants or sole 
organizers – who played the major role in subsequent evolution of FPA manage-
ment and organizational practices. While the landowners were always the most 
important participants in these FPAs because of their ownership of the lands of the 
floodplains, this aspect gradually became the most important factor in determin-
ing users’ rights in some FPAs. 
This transformation has important implications for CPR theories. For exam-
ple, within the SES framework (Ostrom 2007, 2009; McGinnis and Ostrom 2014) 
this feature of private ownership of floodplain lands can be perceived as a compo-
nent of a Governance System (GS), or even as a component of a Resource System 
(RS), because this private property regime was not directly used to govern the col-
lective use of the floodplains. Nonetheless, this feature has an important impact on 
the collective action situations regarding FPAs, as shown in this study. Regardless 
of within which first tier of the SES framework we place this feature of the studied 
floodplains, our findings indicate that the significance of this feature as a deter-
mining factor of actors’ behaviours, and therefore, of outcomes, increased over 
time. This suggests that the importance of a variable in the governance of CPR 
can be changed over time as a result of the modified perception of a variable and 
its use among actors. In addition, this finding reiterates the continuous challenge 
of ‘developing methods for studying the evolution of action situations over time’ 
(Ostrom 2011, 23).
The participants introduced changes in the FPAs’ organizational composition 
and management practices in light of what they experienced and learned over 
the years. In this process of experiential and experimental learning-by-doing, the 
NGO has also been a partner. These two – adaptive management and the link-
age characteristics of co-management – are the basic components of adaptive co-
management (ACM) (Plummer et al. 2012). However, whether the modifications 
that were implemented in the FPAs can be called ACM depends on whether they 
meet the core components, features, and necessary conditions for an ACM (e.g. 
Plummer et al. 2013) or how they compare with an ACM-based assessment of 
natural resource management (e.g. Stöhr et al. 2014). Such evaluations can be 
made in future studies methodologically built on ACM frameworks. Nonetheless, 
lease-based management was an adaptive development because it was innovated 
by shareholders to solve the problems of financial performance. Thus, to some 
degree, the FPAs evolved through participants’ capacity to respond adaptively in 
the face of challenges they experienced. Although our study found that most, but 
not all, interviewed shareholders were happy with the outcomes of lease-based 
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management, the question whether the lease mechanism led to effective and effi-
cient financial and non-financial management of aquaculture operation requires 
further inquiry. 
Meanwhile, as illustrated in this study, many later developments regard-
ing FPAs were responses – such as the proliferation of FPAs in the Daudkandi 
region, and landowners’ attempts to become rights-holders or concentrate among 
themselves the increasing flow of benefits – that resulted from modified incen-
tives brought about by the community’s integration with the market (cf. Pender 
and Scherr 1999; Agrawal 2001; Gebremedhin et al. 2004; Tucker et al. 2007; 
Cinner et al. 2012). In the case of the present study, the community’s integra-
tion with markets through development of FPAs occurred with the help of the 
NGO. Although its involvement was not limited to that role, since it has been 
continuously shaping the management of the FPAs and governance of the flood-
plain water-bodies, its capacity in these roles is to some extent determined by the 
dynamics of a community’s internal power relationships, as can be seen from the 
example of Pankowri. Thus, an important area to be explored in future research 
can be the dynamics of communal power relationships and their impact on the 
governance of floodplains and management of their uses.
Of the five studied sites, no other site showed developments like those of the 
Daudkandi region. These developments, including lease-based management of 
aquaculture and the rise of professional lessees, were the results of more than 
two decades of FPA expansion in and around the Daudkandi region. Although 
the interviewees from the other four sites reported few aquaculture initiatives 
besides the NFPAs, their number, level of fish production, revenues, and com-
munity participation have yet to reach what we observed in the Daudkandi region. 
Nonetheless, the direction of the FPA evolution in these regions should be care-
fully examined in the particular context of expanding FPA trends and the overall 
context of community-based CPR management.
In any case, the introduction of aquaculture in seasonal floodplain water-
bodies is an altered way of using existing resources. This altered way entails not 
only new management practices underpinned by newly defined property rights-
holders, but also new levels of involvement from the rights-holders. Enhanced use 
of the floodplain to obtain higher yield requires a higher degree of involvement 
from the authorized and contributing users. In the context of heightened aware-
ness of profitability of FPA enterprises, the twofold challenge for the future will 
be, first, how the local poor or marginal community members can claim or main-
tain endowed claims over time of benefits for which they made no contribution, 
and second, how the benefits from FPAs can be made more wide-ranging through 
continued inclusion of non-landowners.
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